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A Final Flowering of the Developmental State: The IT Policy 
Experiment of the Korean Information Infrastructure, 1995–2005  
 
Abstract  
In contrast to the private-led initiative typified by the US Information Superhighway project 
in the early 90s, the Korean government was in the forefront of directing the Korean 
Information Infrastructure (KII) project (1995–2005), which was aimed at building a 
nationwide broadband backbone network. This study first looks at how the developmental 
mechanism of Korea during the KII project signifies the weaker status of the civilian 
government of the 90s. This study then shows how in the KII project, the government served 
primarily as a moderator mediating conflicts between the private sector and the relevant 
public agencies. To describe the close state-capital linkages in the KII project, this study 
focuses on the government’s financial investment system for enticing the private sector to 
install the IT infrastructure, the neatly coordinated policy networks between the public and 
private entities, and the policy discourses by which the government achieved a national 
consensus on IT-driven economic development. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the late 80s, the Korean government had to rapidly transform its developmental 
mechanisms in response to external pressures such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreements and the US–Korea bilateral trade negotiations and internal ones such as the mass 
protest against the authoritarian state since 1987, the growth in power of the elite Chaebols, 
— the Korean form of crony capitalismi — and the decline of the foreign market due to the 
Korea’s export-oriented manufacturing industry. Driven by the global-local dynamics, the 
“strong state” model in Korea has gradually withered and been replaced by the “flexible 
state” or “market-driven state.”    
The Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project was designed during this decline 
in the power of the state. Imitating the US National Information Initiative (NII), the KII’s 
main goal was to interconnect the public agencies through a high-speed broadband network, 
and eventually to promote IT productivity in the private sector and to create a larger job 
market through this network. In contrast to American NII initiative, which was led by the 
private sector, in Korea the government took the leading role in guiding the KII from start to 
finish. Through the KII project, the three major stakeholders — the state, the national telecom 
duopoly (KT and Dacom), and the Chaebols — have become deeply interpenetrated, by 
means of state financial support, organizational collaboration, and a hegemonic consensus 
manufactured by the government’s IT-related rhetoric. The KII project represents a mixture 
of the old and the new developmental state model, which is characterized more by the 
collaborative ties between the state and the private sector rather than by the state’s dominance 
over the private sector. Inheriting the legacy of the old developmental state,ii the KII project 
was a final example of the state’s ability to launch, guide, and complete a major national IT 
policy initiative. 
This paper is a policy analysis of the KII project as an example of an evolving phase 
of the developmental state model. This policy analysis aims to detail the deep structure of the 
relationships between the state and large capital directly involved in implementing the KII 
project, investigating how they enter into alliances with each other and how they articulate 
their own interests as they relate to implementing the project. 
Within political elites in Korea, the KII project is seen as a very recent successful 
story of state interventionism since the Korean economic crisis of 1997. Many scholars view 
the IT project in Korea as the “second” phase of the Asian economic miracle: the first phase 
involved Asia catching up to the West in the industrial economy, while the second phase 
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involves Asia becoming the leader in IT fields. The objective of the paper is to challenge the 
optimistic view of the ostensibly successful IT project in Korea, and instead to focus on the 
hidden mechanisms for implementing the KII project. In so doing, this paper seeks to observe 
the state–business linkages and the sacrifice of other stakeholders in order to create or 
maintain those links.  
 
2. Research method  
Confronting East Asia’s economic “miracle” during 1970s and 1980s, a group of 
social scientists in the West turned away from neoclassical or market-centered view and 
dependency theories and developed alternative interpretations for the new phenomenon. The 
academic field known as “developmental state theories” rapidly grew to explain how the 
interventionist role of the state in the four “Asian Tigers” — Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan — allowed these countries to successfully catch up with the 
industrialization of the West. Although the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, which 
represented a harbinger of global instability, diminished scholarly interest in “developmental 
state theories,” it is obvious that, even after this economic turmoil, a rigid tendency toward 
state interventionism in the economy has survived in East Asian states, and the interventionist 
state has partly succeeded in promoting the national information economy — while 
simultaneously creating massive new labor market insecurities, the intensification of 
inequality, and exploitation (Burkett & Hart-Landsberg, 1998; Pirie, 2006). At the theoretical 
level, this paper rereads the old developmental arguments anew, and rethinks those arguments 
in the light of the state-led KII project in Korea. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze the contextual factors that 
conditioned the Korean Information Infrastructure (KII) project implemented by the Korean 
government from 1995 to 2005. The primary research question of this paper is to observe 
what kinds of symbiotic relationships between governmental and business entities have 
developed through the KII project. Concretely, this paper examines how the state has 
constructed a new relationship with the Chaebols through the KII project, far from the 
authoritarian and interventionist state in the past military regimes directing over the 
Chaebols. In other words, the paper shows how the state, the rapidly growing telecom 
duopolies, and the Chaebols in Korea have become deeply interpenetrated, by means of state 
financial support, the organizational collaboration between these entities, and a hegemonic 
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consensus. This paper limits the observed scope of the linkages to the government-led 
investment in the private sector and the organizational network of collaboration.  
To investigate the symbiotic relationship between the state and the private sector in 
the KII project, this paper has the following structure: it first explores the scholarly literature 
based on the developmental state theories that has described the patterns of such collaborative 
ties. The analysis then focuses on the prior-investment system led by the government, the 
policy consultation bodies created for the project between the state and the telecom 
incumbents, and the government’s IT policy rhetoric for creating a hegemonic consensus. 
This paper concludes that the denser the network of state–business alliances or linkages 
becomes the more citizens are excluded from the decision-making processes. 
This paper uses data from in-depth interviews with government officials from the 
Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC), the National Computerization Agency 
(NCA — now the National Information Society Agency), and the telecom companies KT and 
Dacom, as well as official documents relating to the project published by the MIC and the 
NCA that contain organizational charts and describe the major stakeholders’ relationships 
and the changes in their policy network based on the shifts in specific policy goals. 
 
3. The Transformative Phases of the Developmental State in Korea 
In modern Korea, the concept of the developmental state arose under the first military regime 
(1963–79), that of Cheong-hee Park, who came to power by coup d’état. Park achieved rapid 
economic growth by upgrading the import-substitution economiesiii of the Syngman Rhee 
(1948–60) and Po Sun Yun (1960–62) administrations, which were largely dependent on US 
aid, to export-oriented economies through the state-bank-Chaebol nexus. Park’s regime is 
commonly described as kaebal-dokjae, which means “economic growth through 
dictatorship.” During the Park regime, government–business relationships were formed under 
the “overall guidance of a pilot planning agency” (Johnson, 1987: 145), such as the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB), which set forth a socialist-style national plan for 
industrialization. There were, in fact, five successive five-year macro-economic plans 
between 1963 and 1986. The Park administration thus became an archetype of the 
developmental state which successfully accomplished industrial modernization in the shortest 
time. The Park regime was based on a strong repressive state, the state’s dominance over the 
private sector, and growth-oriented interventionism involving labor exploitation and 
suppression.iv 
 Even after Park’s assassination in 1979 by his intelligence chief, the military-backed 
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interventionism in the market by the administration of General Doo-hwan Chun (1980–88), 
who once again came to power in a military coup, was extensive until the 1987 pro-
democracy movement forced him to introduce a direct presidential voting system. After 
taking power, Chun appointed technocrats who had earned doctoral degrees in Economics in 
the US and were known as followers of the neoliberal Milton Friedman (Kim, 1999). This 
hardly means, however, that the Chun administration whole-heartedly embraced laissez-faire 
economics. Greatly influenced by the global trend of neoconservatism promoted from the 
early 1980s onwards by Reagan in the US (Reaganism) and Thatcher in Britain 
(Thatcherism), Chun intervened strongly and directly in the market under neoconservatism.  
 Chun always saw Cheong-hee Park as his role model, and his regime was the 
embodiment of the strong, repressive state. For instance, in 1980, to silence voices critical to 
his regime, Chun enacted the Basic Press Law and forcefully conducted the eonron-
tongpaehap, the “compulsory reform of the media.” Chun commanded KBS, the state-owned 
broadcaster, to absorb the TBC television network, which was owned by Samsung Corp. He 
also ordered the pro-government newspaper, Kyonghyang Shinmun, to absorb Shin-A Ilbo, a 
daily newspaper, and forced at least six local newspapers to close their business permanently. 
Over 700 journalists were dismissed from their jobs and the remaining newspapers were 
subjected to a high degree of government control (Billet, 1990). As another example of his 
use of state power against the Chaebols, in 1985 Chun dismantled the seventh largest 
conglomerate in the nation, the Kookjae group, which had around 200 subsidiaries at that 
time, merely because it refused to donate “political funds” (protection money, in essence). 
This example shows that regime had the power to punish the Chaebols for the slightest 
disobedience, and also illustrates the rent-seeking relations between the ruling junta and the 
business elites.  
Since the changing political climate brought about by the democratization movement 
of 1987, the public began to critique the symbiosis between the government and the 
Chaebols. The domestic capital itself began to demand a market economy free from the 
government’s direct intervention. Due to the rapid growth of the Chaebols and the rising 
political pressure from below, the government could not wield absolute power over the 
private sector any more. During the presidency of Tae-Woo Noh (1988–93), Chun’s 
designated successor, the technocrats chose a via media in which the Chaebols were 
supported by being granted lucrative business licenses, special loans and other financial 
benefits from government agencies, and contracts to build the national infrastructure to 
promote market efficiencies. For instance, in 1992 the Noh administration licensed 
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Sunkyong, the seventh largest Chaebol in the nation, as the cellular phone provider over the 
other more competitive bidders because the son of Sunkyong’s owner was married to 
President Noh’s daughter. Although the license was ultimately withdrawn due to the public’s 
growing antipathy, the case was a typical example of Korea’s crony capitalism.  
Under the administration of Young-Sam Kim (1993–1998), the first democratically 
elected president, the government endorsed the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), an 
organization largely representing the Chaebols’ interests, to select the assignees for the 
telecom licenses during the telecom reform of 1993. In 1995 the government allowed the 
Chaebols to enter the media industry by granting them profitable new licenses for cable 
television services (Shim, 2002). The Chaebols became the largest recipients of the lucrative 
profits stemming from the state’s permission to launch new business in the telecom and 
media sector. During this time, the domestic Chaebols have also expanded their scope into 
the global market through building subsidiaries and investing the capital. Further, the 
Chaebols also borrowed low-interest foreign loans — as of 1996, the average debt ratio of 
the 30 top conglomerates reached 450% — without screening by the government. The 
Chaebols’ dependence on foreign financial capital accelerated the 1997 economic crisis due 
to volatile foreign hedge funds, speculative capital, and international lending. Under the 
pressure of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and the IMF bailout program 
— in which Korea obtained $US58 billion of emergency loans — the Dae-Jung Kim 
administration (1998–2003) privatized KT, the state-owned telecom incumbent, and fully 
opened the domestic banking, media, and telecom market, among others, to foreign 
investors.v The government’s dominance over the Chaebols has gradually waned, while the 
larger Chaebols have accumulated even more power as the medium-sized ones have declined 
or been absorbed.vi President Moo-hyun Roh (2003–08) confessed the state was losing its 
power to regulate the Chaebols when he commented, “We have already entered into the age 
of big capital having the upper hand over the state.” The Samsung bribery scandal provides 
an illustration of how widespread the Chaebols power may be: in January of 2008, at the 
insistence of civil rights groups, the Roh administration launched an investigation of 
Samsung centered on whether it had amassed slush funds, peddled influence by routinely 
bribing government officials, the media, and members of the judiciary, and engaged in shady 
stock deals to pass control of the group from its chairman, Kun-hee Lee, to his only son. 
Courageous whistle-blower Yong-cheol Kim, the former head of Samsung’s legal affairs 
team, joined by members of the Catholic Priests Association for Justice, told a radio station 
that “the list of bribe-takers includes not just top prosecutors and ministers in the Roh 
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administration, but also people recently nominated or mentioned as possible members of the 
cabinet or high-ranking staff members of the Blue House [the Korean White House]” (Korea 
Times, 10 January 2008). The public, therefore, is skeptical that the “Republic of Samsung” 
can truly be brought to justice considering the extent of Samsung’s power in Korean 
society.vii This scandal reveals that the parasitic bond between corrupt state bureaucrats and 
monopoly capitalists is still very much alive even under a politically progressive 
administration and that the balance of power has rapidly shifted towards the latter since 1997 
financial crisis.  
In sum, Korea’s democratic turmoil in 1987 began the momentum to weaken the 
absolute power the state had enjoyed since 1963, while the 1997 financial crisis under the 
civilian government remarkably enhanced the Chaebols’ power, through their alliance with 
foreign capital; once dominated by the state, it is the Chaebols that now dominate it. In 
responding to shifting external and internal factors, the evolving relationship between the 
state and the conglomerates has transformed the developmental state model from that of the 
strong and repressive state through that of a limited or flexible state to that of the market-
driven state.  
 
4. The KII Project as a Legacy of The Developmental State Model 
The close relationship between the state and economic conglomerates in Korea has often 
been termed jeongkyong yuchak (“the symbiosis of two entities”), which has a negative 
connotation.viii In this symbiosis, the government granted moneymaking licenses to, and 
invested public funds in, the largest conglomerates, and in return the Chaebols donated large 
sums to political slush funds. A unique mechanism of the developmental state is to transcend 
simple rent-seeking links between the two dominant elites and to transform their symbiosis 
into a mechanism for economic growth. Although developmentalism, promoted under the 
slogan of national modernization, conceals such chronic problems as an unethical business 
culture, power elitism, cronyism, corruption, corporate suppression of labor, deep class 
divisions, and the public’s exclusion from the decision-making process, nevertheless, the 
unethical mechanisms of jeongkyong yuchak have been a driving force for economic growth, 
curbing the excessive penetration of foreign capital and enhancing the market 
competitiveness of domestic conglomerates. 
Many scholars have explored the transformations of state–business relationships in 
Korea, focusing on cross-regime variations in economic development, specifically, the 
shifting the balance of power between the two. Analyses of Korean state–business relations 
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include a shift “from dominance to symbiosis” (Kim, 1988); “governed interdependence” 
(Weiss, 1988); a “pragmatic mix of government guidance with private initiative” (Jeon, 
1994); the “patron-client relation” (Nam, 1994); a shift from “the stern but stable state-
directed symbiotic partnership to a more unruly and erratic partnership” (Moon, 1994); 
“embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995); “public-private reciprocity” (Fields, 1997); the shift 
from the developmental state to the “post-developmental” or “market-driven state” (Kim, 
1999; 2005); “path dependency” (Jang, 2000); an “eclecticism beyond orthodoxies” (Clark, 
2002; Clark & Jung, 2004); a “state–Chaebol alliance based on a more populist social 
contract” (Hundt, 2005); a “transformative state in which the state acted as senior partner 
rather than commander-in-chief” (Cherry, 2005); and the demise of “Korea, Inc.” (the state–
banks–Chaebols complex) and the rise of “neoliberal consensus” (the coalition of Chaebols, 
technocrats, politicians, economic experts, and NGOs) (Lim & Jang, 2006; Lee & Han, 
2006).  
Despite their slightly different foci and analyses, most studies note the major 
contextual factors weakening the state’s power, such as the growing Chaebol-dominated 
economy, increasing democratization, and global pressures for liberalization. They also agree 
that the Korean state’s modus operandi has changed considerably from the military regimes 
to the civilian governments. Some of the studies further subdivide their analyses by into 
periods marked by such historical events as the citizen’s uprising of 1987 and the IMF 
financial crisis of 1997. Some scholars describe the shifts in the state–Chaebol relationship as 
if the older relationship has been completely annulled by the new. The present analysis, in 
contrast, sees the state-business linkages as transformative and continuously evolving, while 
retaining embedded traces of the past. As shown in Figure 1, the KII project, which extended 
from 1995 to 2005, was accomplished during Korea’s evolution from a limited or flexible 
development state to a market-driven or post-development state. These phases of evolution 
are quite distant from the strong state model exemplified by the first two military regimes 
(those of Park and Chun). Initiated during the flexible state phase, the KII project involved 
coordinative state–business relationships which were maintained through continuous 
negotiation processes carried out by a series of intermediary committees. Nevertheless, the 
entire project was initiated, developed, and guided by the state — a situation which would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to replicate in Korea’s present post-developmental state phase of 
evolution. 
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Figure 1. The evolving phases of the developmental state and the KII project 
 
 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
5. The Close State–Business Linkages Throughout the KII Project 
The major goal of Young-Sam Kim’s administration was to shift Korea away from its export-
centered economy, which had been the major mechanism of market productivity under the 
military regimes, and search out a new source of profits for the domestic conglomerates. Kim 
favored the affiliation of Korea into the global economy and regarded the KII as a powerful 
engine to drive the nation’s economic structure towards the knowledge-based economy. By 
interconnecting government agencies and public institutions with high-speed broadband 
networks, he sought to upgrade the nation’s infrastructure and expand its capacities to create 
a new IT-driven market. In 1994, the Kim administration announced the broad master plan 
for the KII and launched the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC), which 
absorbed the major IT-related administrative functions from other ministries. In 1995, the 
government also issued the “Framework Act on Informatization Promotion” (FAIP, Act No. 
4969) which included the legal provisions for conducting the KII policy plan which set forth 
the R&D goals to be met, provided the funding for the long-term IT project, and established 
the top decision-making committee and its subsidiary bodies. 
 The KII project has been highly praised as a successful policy experiment by 
government officials, policymakers, scholars, and journalists from foreign countries, who 
focus on Korea’s attainment of “broadband heaven” through vigorous state leadership and 
corporate cooperation. Few, however, have examined the inner mechanisms of the KII 
project’s success such as the state-led funding structure, the special steering and intermediate 
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committees, and the consensual dynamics of IT discourse. This section investigates the 
mechanisms that made the eleven-year state-led project viable, and examines how the state-
business linkages have became more flexible and less consistent since the demise of the 
strong, repressive state.     
 
5.1. Taming the Telecom Incumbents with the Carrot, Not the Stick  
Information infrastructure projects such as the KII are typically burdensome to the private 
sector, and corporations are therefore usually less than enthusiastic about such plans, which 
involve massive, long-term investment, high risk, and uncertain returns (for this reason, the 
Clinton–Gore NII initiative failed to attract the necessary private sector involvement). To 
involve Korean Telecom (KT) and Dacom in the KII project, the Kim administration offered 
a variety of enticements: preferential tax treatment, the granting of new licenses, and 
investment loans underwritten by the government. KT, the domestic telecom incumbent, was 
relatively favorable to the government, which was its dominant stockholder until KT was 
completely privatized in 2002 (Kim, 5 June 2007). The government had also allowed Dacom 
to acquire licenses for international and long-distance telephony services during the national 
telecom restructurings of 1990 and 1994, respectively, which were initiated for the purpose of 
curbing the international pressure for telecom market liberalization, and Dacom had rapidly 
emerged as the second largest telecom company in Korea. As a result, the government was 
able to gain the cooperation of the two telecom incumbents without any great conflict. A 
deputy director of LG Dacom described the situation this way: 
 
The KII project was very supportive for the private partners in that the government 
minimized our business risk by its public investment. At that time nobody dared to 
invest the enormous funds for it; through the public funding, Dacom was able to 
leapfrog ahead by facilitating the nationwide optical networks. The contribution from 
public investment was highly significant. (Song, 29 May 2007)    
 
A manager of KT’s Network Investment Planning Department also agreed on the effect of 
the state-sponsored investment: 
It is obvious that the state-led “investment first, construction next” policy plan gave 
KT and Dacom the incentive to participate in the KII project without a great business 
risk, and also minimized the potential friction between the government and us 
throughout the project. In those days, KT, as the first partner in the government 
project, benefited from the immense state-led investment that allowed us to expand 
the optical networks. (Kim, 1 June 2007) 
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The “investment first, construction next” principle was the telecom companies’ major 
incentive to join in the KII project, allowing them to minimize their investment risk and cost 
at the earlier stage of the project. KT and Dacom also regarded the huge project as a chance 
to upgrade their copper lines to high-speed fiber optic networks.  
  In the building of the backbone networks connecting the public agencies and 
institutions — the so-called KII-G — KT was allotted a 70% share and Dacom a 30% share. 
The KII-public (KII-P) was independently built as a commercial network through the budget 
of the telecom companies themselves, and the KII-testbed (KII-T), the optimal high speed 
R&D network, was built by the public-private partnership. For the KII-G, its most important 
backbone network, the government invested a total of $US6.2 billion over the three phases. 
At the beginning, the government as the major stakeholder aimed to own the backbone 
network directly and grant the telecom companies a 25-year lease to it. The government — 
specifically, the MIC as funding distributor and the National Computerization Agency (NCA, 
now the National Information Society Agency) as funding manager and coordinator — also 
pressured the telecom operators to apply an 80% or 90% discount to the proposed online 
service charges for public agencies that would become subscribers in September of 1997. As 
Che-Hyun Jo, the Deputy Director of Dacom and one of the key actors in the KII-G project, 
noted in his official interview with the NCA (2005), the discount rate requested by the 
government was burdensome, and the mood became very dark within the telecom companies. 
The sensitive issues of the KII-G network ownership and service charges triggered critical 
conflicts between the government and the private sector. In addition, the Board of Audit and 
Inspection (BAI)’s questioning of the MIC’s funding method for installing the optical lines in 
1996 jeopardized the completion of the project itself (NCA, 2005, p. 130–131).  
This crisis at the early stages of the project (1995–1997) finally caused the MIC to 
change the subscriber costs and ownership structure: It decided to transfer ownership of the 
fiber-optic backbone lines to KT and Dacom and to establish a joint public-private sector KII 
fund (a so-called “bilateral netting account”) out of which the KII-G would be built and out 
of which the government would subsidize 40% of the subscriber service charge. In return, the 
two telecom companies agreed to reimburse the joint fund a portion of their profits year by 
year until their government loans were paid off, and to offer a 40% discount rate to KII-G 
subscribers. As an interviewee who was an official at the NCA, which managed the cost 
system between two entities, commented, the new cost mechanisms for the KII-G enabled by 
the government subsidies led to a breakthrough in the conflicts between the government and 
the private sector (Rha, 28 May 2007). Further, since a 40% discount and a 40% government 
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subsidy was applied to the service charges, government agencies and public institutions were 
able to receive broadband Internet for 20% of the actual cost, and institutional users grew 
rapidly — from 2,184 subscriber lines in 1996 to 30,137 lines in 1998 (Lee et al., 2007). 
Once a critical mass of subscribers had been reached, the government was able to complete 
the KII-G phase of the project without further difficulty.   
 The increase in subscribers from public institutions and agencies brought a more 
stable flow of profits to the telecom companies, and this, in turn, furthered the development 
of the KII-P, the commercial network. At this point, the government could not overtly 
intervene in guiding the KII-P because of external pressuresix brought to bear on the 
government. As an official of the NCA (now the NIA) describes it,  
 
In the mid-90s, the government had no choice but to leave the KII-P’s development in 
the hands of the private sector. Under strong global pressure to liberalize the telecom 
market, the government could not intervene in the market or lead the KII-P directly, 
but could only recommend the government’s roadmap to the private sector. 
Otherwise, it might cause serious friction in US–Korea trade relations. (Jeong, 5 June 
2007) 
 
Despite this, since 1997 the government has successfully stimulated private investment in the 
local loop and facility-based competition by introducing the so-called “cyber-building 
certificate program” into the KII-P. Through this certificate program, apartments and 
buildings were ranked according to their capacity to handle high-speed Internet.x As a public 
official who worked for the KII project pointed out, because South Korea’s population is 
largely located in a few large urban areas and because most residents live in large apartment 
buildings, the MIC’s facility-based Internet promotion policy was effective in expanding the 
penetration of high-speed Internet service into the general public. He added that, in the early 
stages of this program, the certificate system also allowed construction companies to raise the 
mortgage price on new government-certified “Internet-ready” apartments (Moon, 7 June 
2007). The demand created through the indirect promotion of broadband Internet assured the 
telecom companies and the construction companies — the latter of which were mostly owned 
by the Chaebols — a steady stream of new customers. Further, since 2001 the Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation (MCT) has required that all new apartments or multi-
dwelling units have broadband Internet connections (Falch, 2007; Lee & Chan-Olmsted, 
2004).  
In sum, the domestic telecom companies were fully supported by the state both 
through the immense financial underwriting of the KII-G and the assurance of fixed 
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subscribers and then the MCT’s promotion of the KII-P through the certificate system 
together. Rather than the state dominating the private sector by top-town command, as in an 
earlier period, disagreements between the two were settled by a series of bilateral 
negotiations between the state and the telecom companies. As a principal researcher at the 
NIA notes, “These close public-private relationships reflect the specific political system of 
Korea” (Jeong, June 5 2007). The KII project, thus, is a prime example of the limited or 
flexible state model — of the shift in state–capital relations “from dominance to symbiosis” 
(Kim, 1988). 
 
5.2. Intermediary Organizations for the KII Project 
In the early 90s, before the launch of the KII project, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) — 
which then regulated the national budget office — was hesitant to allocate the immense 
public funds necessary for the project because its cost–benefit justification was weak. 
Further, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) argued that most equipment 
for the networks fell under its jurisdiction and thus that the MOTIE was responsible for the 
KII project, whereas the MIC’s focus was on the regulatory aspects of the network-based 
telecom market (Jeong & King, 1997). The KII project, however, was seen as the engine in a 
plan for national economic growth, and neither bureaucratic gridlock nor budgetary concerns 
could long be sustained in the face of such a vision.  
Just after the Basic Plan for the KII project was announced in 1993, the government 
organized the KII Taskforce to draw up a more concrete roadmap for the project. The 
Taskforce was made up of officials from the MIC and the NCA, from the telecom provider 
KT, and from the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), which is 
the government-sponsored R&D institute. Based on the Taskforce’s preliminary investigation 
into the viability of the KII project, in May 1994 the government created the KII Steering 
Committee (Presidential Order No.14275), which was composed of the Prime Minister, as the 
chair, and twelve relevant cabinet ministers. Under the KII Steering Committee, the 
government appointed the KII Working Committee, chaired by the Vice-Minister of the 
Korea Development Institute (KDI, a semi-governmental think tank), and high-ranking 
officials of the relevant government agencies. Under this KII Working Committee, the 
government organized the KII Planning Board to carry out such concrete tasks as designing 
the master plan, gathering the public funds, and developing the technologies to be employed 
in the backbone network. 
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Figure 2. Organizational Chart of the KII Planning Board 
 
 
  
 Source: author and mostly MIC & NCA (2005, p. 61) 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the IT Policy Chief at the MoC (now MIC) is the head of the 
Planning Board, which made up of six divisions, each related to some aspect of the project’s 
scope: the KII Coordination & Planning Division, the KII-G Planning Division, the KII-P 
Planning Division, the KII R&D Division, the KII Management Division, and the KII Market 
Support Division. The members of these six divisions were selected from the following: the 
public officials of the MIC, the MOTIE, the KDI, and the Ministry of Finance and Economy; 
experts and researchers from the ETRI and the NCA; and officials from the telecom 
companies of KT, Dacom, and Korean Mobile Telecom (now SK Telecom). With the help of 
the KII Advisory Committee, set up for the purpose of policy advice, the Planning Board 
directed the KII project from its inception until 1995, when its affairs were transferred to the 
Informatization and Planning Office at the MIC (NCA, 2006; MIC & NCA, 2005). From 
early in the national IT project, therefore, the government ensured the interconnection of the 
private sector and the relevant public agencies through this Planning Board. 
The KII was developed in three phases, based on the shifting of specific policy goals. 
During the first phase of building a backbone network (1995–1997) and the second phase of 
backbone network completion (1998–2000), the KII-G Steering Council and the KII-G 
Service Council — which succeeded the KII Planning Board in 1995 — were assigned to 
monitor the ongoing probable issues and discuss the service cost, quality, and upgrade, with 
the private sector representatives. These Councils mediated a series of conflicts between the 
state and the private sector in the earlier phase of the project. In contrast to the KII-P, which 
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was mostly left to the self-ruling mechanisms of market, the government steadily steered the 
KII-G project to completion by means of these intermediary organizations. By the beginning 
of the second phase of the KII project, President Dae-Jung Kim was politically overburdened 
with managing the IMF financial crisis and the WTO agreements, both of which occurred in 
1997. The government considered requesting the National Assembly to reduce the budget 
allotted to the KII project but decided to maintain the pre-assigned quotas of the KII 
infrastructure investment. On the threshold of the third and final phase of the KII project 
(2001–2005), the Kim administration began to focus on the backbone network as a 
significant catalyst for market development.  
To comply with Kim’s ambitious vision, in 2001 the government organized the 
Committee for the KII Advancement, which included the major private actors and public 
institutions involved in building the three backbone networks — the KII-G, the KII-P, and 
the KII-T. Figure 3 shows the organizational chart of the Committee for the KII 
Advancement. The Office of the KII Advancement — a new entity created by the NCA — 
coordinated the whole organization by mediating between the four Subcommittees: the KII-T 
Advancement Subcommittee, the KII-G Advancement Subcommittee, the KII-P 
Advancement Subcommittee, and the R&D Subcommittee.  
 
Figure 3 Organizational chart of the Committee for the KII Advancement 
 
 
   Source: NCA (2003, January) 
 
Each Subcommittee was composed of high-ranking officials from the government agencies, 
the mobile and landline telecom service providers, the government-sponsored R&D research 
centers, the IT policy research institutes, the major Chaebols as the telecom equipment 
manufacturers, the IT-related business associations, and the universities (NCA, January 
2003). By embracing new entrants into the project such as the mobile telecom service 
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providers, the commercial Internet service providers, and the Chaebols as telecom equipment 
manufacturers in addition to the established participants, the government desired to maximize 
the economic effects of the KII project.  
The main issues discussed by the Committee were promoting the domestic telecom 
equipment market, nurturing the software and media contents market, and creating 
commercial values from the KII (NCA, 2003, p. 10–11). The Committee for the KII 
Advancement promoted upgrading the national information infrastructure in order to 
reposition it for the new economy. The telecom equipment market, however, was getting 
worse, because, after 2001, the national telecom vendors ceased to produce and install the 
domestically-made asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) switch, which was a critical 
component of the high-speed information network, due to its outmodedness by the IP-based 
router, and replaced many of the ATM switches with foreign IP-based router equipment. The 
ATM was a core technology, developed by a coalition of the state, the R&D institute (ETRI), 
and the Chaebols, by which the government had created a new domestic demand for telecom 
manufacture and thus had shielded the national telecom market from the dominant market 
power of the multinational telecom companies. Due to the change of the technological 
paradigm created by the emergence of the Internet, however, the government was forced to 
shift its R&D support from a growth policy centered on the old ATM switch to one centered 
on the new IP-based router. They had waited too late, however, and the state–private sector 
attempt to develop a core IP network technology and redirect the technology’s developmental 
path failed.          
According to a principal researcher of the NCA (Jeong, 5 June 2007), the government 
spent KR 4–5 billion won (approximately $US500 million) for operating the intermediary 
organizations described above. This expenditure signifies the government’s bid to enhance 
the bureaucratic efficiencies. In fact, the IT-related inter-ministerial structures such as the KII 
Planning Board were a legacy of old National Basic Information System (NBIS), a national 
computerization project launched under the Chun administration. Chun first conceived of 
information and technology as a new engine of economic growth, as well as a bureaucratic 
tool to rationalize the organizational structures of the public sector through the use of a 
backbone network. Just as the civilian government established the KII Steering Committee in 
1994, the military regime organized the NBIS Steering Committee, an inter-ministerial 
agency, in 1989, to resolve potentially problematic issues affecting several different 
government departments. Since the period of the military regimes, then, intermediary 
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organizations have served as the policy mechanisms to minimize internal conflict and 
enhance the speed of decision-making processes through efficient consensual mechanisms.  
The series of intermediary organizations for the KII project reflects the Korean 
government’s inability to enact the national infrastructure plans through a top-down 
command structure over the private sector, and its anxious desire to attract them into the 
policy planning process. The intermediary organizations were quite efficient at least in 
lessening the friction with the private sector, while at the same time they intentionally 
excluded the voices of civil society from the decision-making process. Figure 2 and 3 show 
graphically the lack of any conduit to transmit the citizens’ concerns into the special 
committees. From the start of the KII project, the government simply considered the supply 
side for enhancing the broadband networks through a strategic partnership with the private 
sector, ignoring the possibility of the citizens’ participation. The government could defend 
itself by arguing that it through the KII project served the public interest by enabling more 
high-speed Internet access and at lower prices. The national IT policy initiative, however, 
manifested such undemocratic characteristics as uncritical technocratic IT promotion, 
preferential treatment for a few private sector incumbents, and profit-driven strategy plans. 
The logic of exclusion relying on the top-down policy-making process enabled the 
government to exhibit its cause rather than to hear the real voices of the citizens.  
 
5.3. The Exhibitionist IT Policy Initiatives and Discourses  
The government’s nationwide IT policy was greatly mobilized by the technocrats’ 
“exhibitionist” policy discourses aimed at accomplishing the goal of “internationalization,” a 
term that dominated the rhetoric of the Young-sam Kim administration (1993–98). The KII 
project would not have been possible without the active propagation of IT policy plans, and 
each successive administration has proliferated a series of IT policy initiatives and their 
accompanying rhetoric. To evoke the national goal of building a backbone network, in 1996 
the Kim administration announced the Basic Plan on Informatization Promotion (BPIP), the 
first IT policy initiative at the national level. The first goal of this initiative was to popularize 
the slogan of IT-based development throughout Korea, among government officials at the 
national and the provincial level, as well as in the private sector. The second goal was to 
develop a roadmap to the KII under government guidance and to adopt it to the rapidly 
changing environment of electronic backbone networks being built in the advanced countries. 
The third, more concrete, goal was to enhance transmission capacity and geographic coverage 
of the broadband network through the KII project. By improving the penetration rate of the 
State–Business Symbiosis in Korea’s IT Project	   18 
high-speed Internet, the government believed that Korean society would become “a world-
class strong IT country” (MIC, 1996). 
The Kim administration used the BPIP as a public relations tool for promoting the KII 
project. Under President Dae-Jung Kim, IT policy was promoted by even more colorful 
rhetoric about the dreams of a flourishing IT-driven Korean society. Kim, once a prominent 
political activist, was focused on alleviating the economic recession that had taken hold of 
Korea since the 1997 IMF crisis. The financial crisis meant that the Kim administration, 
which took office in March of 1998, inherited the heavy political burden of attempting to 
restructure the domestic market so as to open it to competition from global conglomerates. 
While Dae-Jung Kim had advocated a democratic reform of the old authoritarian regime, 
under the conditions of increasing globalization his policy shifted to the radical adoption of 
neoliberal economic policies and to promoting the information and culture industries over the 
labor-intensive heavy industries. Because of Kim’s success in enacting political reform, 
opposition to his administration’s economic drive toward privatization and commercialization 
was muted (Cho, 2000, p. 422). Kim emphasized the value-added economic effects of the 
cultural industry and began to consider that the development of software and media contents 
be prioritized over other strategies to nurture the national economy. In March of 1999 the 
government announced a second IT policy initiative, CyberKorea 21 (CK21). Since that time, 
both culture and IT have been widely regarded as key elements necessary for earning foreign 
dollars and creating a new job market. 
The policy goal of CK21 under the Kim administration is to create a “knowledge-
based society,” improving “national competitiveness” and “the quality of life to the level of 
the more advanced nations” (NCA, 2002, p. 79). CK21 highlights policy support for IT 
businesses and encouraged policy goals for advanced information and communication 
economies by setting forth planned guidelines for IT growth. CK21 also stressed the state-
driven IT education program, the so-called Informatization Education Plan for 10 Million 
Citizens, and used this slogan to create 300,000 new IT-related jobs and to increase the 
digital literacy of citizens (MIC & NCA, 2005). During this period, the government sought to 
encourage the demand side of the KII, striving for the creation of a critical mass of 
consumers through public IT education. Impelled by Kim’s call for the rapid completion of 
the KII in his New Year’s message in 2001, the MIC announced the Basic Plan for the KII 
Advancement to accelerate the KII’s construction. In September of that year the government 
organized the Committee for the KII Advancement, which was aimed at the market adoption 
of the nationwide information infrastructure, and in April of 2002 the government announced 
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its market-driven policy initiative, named “e-Korea Vision 2006” (eKV06).  
The MIC’s eKV06 states that its goal is both to promote the “information society” at 
the national level and to gain “strong ties of international cooperation with the global 
information society” (NCA, 2003, p. 10). To do this, eKV06 declares that the government 
itself must “create a smart government structure with high transparency and productivity” (e-
government) and should encourage private corporations “to strengthen global 
competitiveness by promoting the informatization of all industries” (e-business) and enable 
citizens “to enhance their ability to utilize information and technologies” (e-education). 
Through implementing these goals, the government hopes to persuade Korean society to 
become “a global leader e-Korea” (MIC & NCA, 2005, p. 100–104). Once the KII project 
entered its final phase, the government’s IT policy agenda targeted three areas: bureaucratic 
efficiencies through “smart government,” e-commerce through the development of media 
contents, and mass digital literacy through the public and private educational institutions. 
While the policy visions set forth in the e-government and e-business areas can be read as 
expanded and concretized provisions of the previous market-oriented IT policies, eKV06’s 
addition of e-education for citizens seems to be a distinct advance on the policies of CK21 or 
the BPIP. It is notable as the first instance of the Korean government considering at a national 
policy level such public issues as the “information gap” between individuals and between 
regions. As is typical of the bureaucratic approach to the citizenry, the government restricted 
its role to inconspicuous tasks, such as supplying computers or promoting commercial 
Internet access, as well as the routinizing and rationalizing of electronic services for citizen 
requests for official documents. The focus is on a quantitative approach that emphasizes 
outward appearance and growth, as seen in the dramatic growth of the IT industry, rather than 
on the “soft” aims of improving the cultural ability of citizens to access, use, and recreate 
information without restraints. The government promoted the cultivation of digital 
technology as a necessity for increasing the efficiency of government bureaucracy, to 
improve national productivity, and to become an active part of the global society. 
President Moo-hyun Roh, who took office in March of 2003, was even more focused 
on the promotion of IT-based development of Korean society.xi In December of the same 
year, his administration issued the “Broadband IT Korea Vision 2007” (BK07), which sets 
forth IT as the real engine for national wealth in Korea that would finally raise the yearly 
salary in Korea to $US20,000 per capita. BK07 emphasizes the geopolitical position of 
Korean economy as “the electronic hub for the East Asian countries.” To accomplish this, 
with the KII plan nearing its end, the government began to design the next generation of 
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infrastructure plans for advancing the private sector networks. For instance, BK07 sets forth 
the goal of building the total broadband multimedia networks of convergence; the details 
were set forth in the “Basic Plan for the Broadband convergence Network (BcN)” and “U-
Sensor Network” (USN), issued in February of 2004; the “Distribution and Promotion Plan 
of the next Internet protocol IPv6,” issued in April of 2004; and the “Master Plan for IT839 
Strategies,”xii issued in July of 2005 (NIA, 2007). In BK07, the Roh administration also 
emphasized that the quality of life in Korea would be improved by the rapidly increasing 
opportunities arising from e-commerce with the completion of the KII-P. While Roh 
succeeded in promoting the development of an Internet-based society in Korea,	  it is apparent 
that his IT initiatives have overemphasized business-oriented growth policies based on values 
such as “efficiencies,” “competitiveness,” and “productivities,” to the detriment of public 
welfare values such as “sustainability,” “public commons,” and “equal opportunities.”	  
Table 1 shows the major IT policy initiatives implemented by each civilian 
government. Interestingly, each president promoted a new IT-related discourse with its own 
IT policy initiative, especially at the beginning of his term.  
 
Table 1 IT Policy Initiatives under the Civilian Governments 
President Young-sam Kim (1993–1998) 
Dae-Jung Kim 
(1998–2003) 
Moo-hyun Roh 
(2003–2008) 
Government 
rhetoric 
Globalization, 
dog-eat-dog competition 
Liberalization, 
knowledge-based society 
Global IT leader, 
participatory society 
IT policy 
initiative 
Basic Plan on 
Informatization 
Promotion (1996–2000) 
CyberKorea 21 
(1999–2002) 
e-Korea 
Vision 2006 
(2002–2006) 
Broadband IT Korea 
Vision 2007 
(2003–2007) 
Goal 
Construction of basic 
electronic backbone 
network 
Creating new IT-
related job market 
Upgrading the IT 
infrastructure 
E-government, 
East Asian hub of the 
IT industry 
Phase 1st Phase (1995–1997) 
2nd Phase (1998–
2000) 
3rd Phase (2001–
2005) 
BcN 
(2006– present) 
Source: author and NCA (2006) data 
 
Throughout the three presidencies, the discourses are centered on Korea’s active affiliation to 
the global society and the advancement of domestic IT economies. The goals centre on the 
creation of a new IT job market, a large demand for broadband Internet initiated by IT 
education, e-governance, and e-commerce. Through the IT policy initiatives, each 
government gave the private sector — specifically, the Chaebols — its blessing, and 
persuaded its citizens to be a member of a Korean-style “information society.” The state’s 
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promotion of IT to its citizens boomeranged on itself by increasing the consumption expenses 
per household: the rate of IT-related consumption (5.4%) per household in Korea is 
burdensome, almost double that in Japan (3.1%) and triple that in the US (1.6%) (Bank of 
Korea, 2005).  
Further, due to the bureaucratic desire of all three presidents, who hoped to bequeath a 
monumental policy inheritance to the citizens within their term, the completion year of the 
KII project was repeatedly moved forward, first to 2015, then to 2010, and finally to 2005, 
when it was actually completed. A principal researcher at the NIA observed, 
 
The reason the KII project was completed by 2005 rather than by 2015 is directly 
related to the presidential pledges of each administration, which aimed to accomplish 
its political outcomes by “exhibitionist” policy initiatives. It is obvious that the three 
phases of the KII project were greatly curtailed or condensed in response to the 
inauguration of a new president. (Jeong, 5 June 2007)       
In fact, the four IT initiatives over three presidencies were often used to exaggerate the real 
conditions of Korean IT development, wrapping these up in exhibitionist PR. Consequently, 
the rhetoric of these initiatives — such as that of surviving global competition and of 
regenerating the national economy — successfully played upon the citizens’ anxieties, such 
that there is now one broadband Internet per household, and allowed the state-led project to 
be completed with ease and even ahead of schedule. 
 
5.4. Lessons learned from the KII project  
The present analysis confirms the facts that, in contrast to the old military regimes, the 
civilian governments since 1993 have articulated various mechanisms, such as intermediary 
organizations and hegemonic strategies, in order to successfully guide the state-led 
infrastructure plan to completion. This paper also assesses the KII project as a prototypical IT 
policy reflecting an evolving phase of the developmental state model (the “flexible” state), an 
IT policy which was enacted in the midst of the shift from the “strong” state to the present 
“market-driven” state. As regards the Chaebols, the KII project has created the material 
conditions enabling them to become “e-Chaebols,” incumbents in new IT sector, as well as in 
the traditional manufacturing sector.  
Theoretically, this paper contributes to a critical reading of the developmental state 
theories through disclosing the negative effects caused by the symbiosis between the state and 
the Chaebols during the KII project and by relating the evolutionary phases of the state power 
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to the Chaebols’ economic growth. The present paper had its origins in questioning the 
popular belief among policymakers that the KII project has improved the quality of Korean 
society and culture and further upgraded the country’s IT status in the global community. It is 
obvious that policy rhetoric that ignores the real conditions behind the successful KII policy 
plan creates a barrier to an accurate evaluation of the KII project by telecom policymakers, 
politicians, and communication scholars. In fact, Korea’s developmentalism — its continuing 
efforts to catch up to the economic power of the advanced nations — has been founded on 
close linkages between the state and powerful corporate interests, which resulted in neglecting 
the participation of the citizenry.  
The underdeveloped political culture of Korea led the KII project to be a half-ripe 
policy: it serves as the material foundation which has made Korea an IT powerhouse but also, 
as policy, it represents the already entrenched corporate interests. The present analysis has 
confirmed that the past legacies of authoritarian interventionism and developmentalism under 
the military regimes still haunt such projects as the KII. Although it was planned and 
implemented under civilian governments, the KII could not escape the authoritarian and 
undemocratic character of the politico-social structure inherited from the military regimes. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The Korean government’s attempt to stimulate the private sector and to create new IT 
demand was extremely successful over the three phases of the KII project. Nevertheless, the 
process by which the KII success story was carried out raises at least one serious issue, that 
of the entire exclusion of the citizens, as previously mentioned, from the decision-making 
process of domestic telecom policies. In the same way, they have been excluded from the 
series of multilateral and bilateral negotiations such as the WTO basic telecom agreement and 
the recent US–Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. In the 2007 FTA 
negotiations with US trade representatives, for instance, the Korean government exerted 
monopolistic power on the decision-making process, ignored minority voices from civil 
society groups.  
Ignoring the citizens in favor of the elites has been rationalized by the state logic that 
nurtures Korea’s large Chaebols at the expense of her middle- and small-sized companies. 
What is needed is a democratic force from below that can exert itself against such interests 
and assert instead the public’s interest. It is an undeniable fact that even in today’s Korea, 
“those with a connection to a few leading political figures have precedence over others who 
might be better qualified” to participate in policymaking (Hyun & Lent, 1999). The backward 
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political conditions in Korea — in essence, conditions of crony capitalism — combined with 
the dominant trends of contemporary global capitalism make it all the more difficult, and yet 
all the more necessary, to construct a democratic forum at the national policy level which is 
sustained from below to work on behalf of the public welfare against the proprietary interests 
of the Chaebols. Understanding the history of the KII project can provide insights into how to 
formulate future telecom policies along much more socially-interventionist lines while 
restraining the overwhelming power of the telecom oligopolies and Chaebols and soliciting 
the input of citizens and citizens’ groups. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Notes 
 
i A Chaebol in Korea means a family-owned business group with large subsidiaries occupying an oligopolistic 
position, despite a relatively low concentration of ownership and the absence of pure holding companies.  
ii Whereas the earlier statists looked at the East Asian “miracle” by focusing on the disjuncture between the state 
and society and the dominance of the state over society (the old developmental state model), the neo-statists 
explore this economic success by focusing on the dense linkages between the state and the private sector (the 
new developmental state model). Even the neo-statists, however, point to the “state-induced deliberate shifting 
of the industrial structure towards higher technology, higher value-added products” (Weiss & Hobson, 1995, p. 
150). In fact, despite the varying emphases on the state–industry linkages, it is clear that both the old and new 
statists agree about the state’s guiding role in the East Asian economic miracle. 
iii Under Rhee’s administration, the state granted the monopoly of the “three white industries” — the processing 
of cotton, flour, and sugar from the US — to the burgeoning domestic businesses that later grew to be the 
family-owned Chaebols such as Samsung and Hyundai.  
iv As an example of how Korea’s political-bureaucratic elites maintained their dominant power over the interests 
of big business, Johnson (1987, p. 157) describes the establishment of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency 
(KCIA), which was founded as an independent political support apparatus, originally built around a 3,000-man 
cadre from the existing Army Counter-Intelligence Corps, which had expanded to some 370,000 employees by 
1964. The KCIA’s original mission focused on counter-communist activities and fighting military corruption. 
Under the military regimes, the KCIA was used as a domestic surveillance and spying agency to collect, 
analyze, and monitor intelligence data on businesses and the citizenry. The intelligence agency enabled the 
development of an extreme disciplinary society which controlled not only any citizen critical of the government 
but also overall business activities.  
v In the aftermath of 1997, a discourse about oeja yuchi (“the enticement of foreign capital”) has dominated 
Korean society as it seeks to recover from the recession (Lim & Jang, 2006). This discourse was used to 
legitimize the full-fledged opening of the domestic market to foreign investors. 
vi Since the 1997 financial crisis, the concentration of power in the hands of the larger Chaebols was accelerated 
by such events as the collapse of the Daewoo Group, the divestiture of the Hyundai Group, the change of the LG 
Group into a holding company, and foreign investors’ takeover attempt of SK and KT&G (Lee, 2006). 
vii In the financial crisis of 1997, when the IMF forced the Korean market to follow its structural adjustment 
program, many Korean mega-conglomerates collapsed in the re-structuring of the domestic economy that 
ensued, but Samsung seized its opportunity and jumped into first place in the domestic market. The different 
divisions of Samsung are now a set of huge monopolies, and the corporation as a whole ranks as number one 
among Korea’s ruling conglomerates, accounting for one-fifth of the country’s exports. Samsung Corporation 
encompasses almost every profitable industry under its business logo: Samsung Electronics, Samsung SDI, and 
Renault Samsung Motors, as well as Samsung Securities, Life Insurance, Credit Card, Heavy Industries, 
Engineering, Everland Theme Park, Advertising, Petrochemicals, Shopping, Cable Channels, and so forth. 
Samsung’s rapid capital accumulation has been made possible by its omnipresent power in the Korean economy 
and society — described by such common terms as “Samsung’s way” or “the Republic of Samsung” — and by 
its collaboration with the state in controlling the labor market. While Samsung contributed significantly to 
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promoting Korea’s national economy in the global market, its dominant market power, with a total of 62 
subsidiaries and a sales record of $US1.39 trillion (as of April 2005), makes it a pervasive and overwhelming 
force in both the Korean economy and Korean society.  
viii In addition to jeongkyong yuchak, under Park’s junta, the term gwanchi gyeongjae, or “state-controlled 
economy,” was a commonly used to denounce the military elites’ intervention in the market. 
ix The external pressures include the Korea–US bilateral negotiations, the trade sanctions imposed by the US 
Trade Representative (USTR), and the WTO regulatory system. 
x Under the “cyber-building certificate system,” the government set standards on domestic and business 
premises with three levels according to their capacity to handle high-speed Internet traffic capacity, and granted 
the certificates to qualified buildings. This certification gave builders a motivation to enhance the broadband 
access platform of apartments and buildings. (Yun, Lee & Lim, September 2002; Lee & Chan-Olmsted, 2004). 
xi President Roh has been described as “the world’s first president to be elected with the broad support of the 
online generation” (Watts, 24 February 2003, p. 16). His image at the time of his inauguration was one of being 
technically flexible and open to the Internet. Midway in his term of office, Roh held an unprecedented “Internet 
conversation with the nation” on 23 March, 2006, which had the largest audience in the history of online 
broadcasting in Korea. Moreover, the president himself uploaded five letters per a month onto the presidential 
website, named the Office of the President Briefing, in order to promote direct communication with the nation 
without the intervention of the press. His nickname “the night-owl president” is derived from his staying at the 
keyboard until late at night for decision-making and electronic approval of e-documents through the electronic 
record management system that he himself invented (Lee & Lee, 2009, in press). 
xii IT “839” was dubbed from three pillars (services, infrastructure, new growth engines): eight telecom services 
(Wi-Bro, DMB, home networking, telematics, RFID, W-CDMA, Terrestrial D-TV, and Internet telephony); 
three infrastructures (broadband convergence network, U-sensor network, and IPv6); and nine new growth 
engines (mobile telephony, digital televisions and broadcast devices, home network equipment, system-on-chip 
products, next-generation personal computer, embedded software, digital content and solutions, vehicle-based 
information equipment, and intelligent robot products) (Shin, 2007).   
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